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THE CATHOLIC JUST WAR TRADITION
AND THE WAR IN IRAQ:
JUST PRE-EMPTIVE WAR, JUST
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION?
DANIEL R. STRECKERt
INTRODUCTION
In response to the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Bush
administration outlined a military strategy for confronting the
twin threats of international terrorism and so-called "rogue
regimes"-states aggressive in their intent, dismissive of
international norms, and untrammeled by customary
international law. This National Security Strategy comprised
two historically fraught principles: preemptive war against
incipient national-security threats and replacing totalitarian
governments with representative democracies.'
The Catholic just war tradition provides an analytical
framework for gauging the morality of applying these two
principles. Just war recognizes that using force to pre-empt
imminent attacks may be a form of justifiable defensive warfare.
Humanitarian intervention, which has gained legitimacy in the
international consciousness since the Cold War's end, may
likewise be permissible in just war theory as an outgrowth of just
war's natural law foundation and emphasis on Christian charity.'
t J.D., 2013, St. John's University School of Law. The author would like to
thank Professor Marc 0. DeGirolami.
'See THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 15 (2002) [hereinafter U.S. SECURITY STRATEGY] ("To forestall
or prevent . .. hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary,
act preemptively."); THE WHITE HOUSE, Introduction to THE NATIONAL SECURITY
STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, supra ("We will defend the peace by
fighting terrorists and tyrants... . We will extend the peace by encouraging free and
open societies on every continent.").
2 John F. Coverdale, An Introduction to the Just War Tradition, 16 PACE INT'L
L. REV. 221, 242 (2004).
See RICHARD J. REGAN, JUST WAR: PRINCIPLES AND CASES 69 (1996); James
Turner Johnson, Thinking Morally About Intervention, 1999 PACEM 181, 185-86
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The United States sought to make both pre-emptive war and
the spread of democracy a reality when it invaded Iraq in March,
2003, with "regime change" as its object.4 The United States
believed Iraq's possession and pursuit of nuclear, biological, and
chemical weapons ("NBC weaponry") posed an unacceptable
threat regionally, as well as to the United States itself.5  In
addition, the Iraqi people lived under conditions that deprived
them of basic human rights; and the United States believed that
removing President Saddam Hussein from power and
establishing a democratic government in Baghdad would
alleviate those conditions.'
This Article uses the just war framwork to examine these
dual justifications for the Iraq War.' It will ask whether the
United States was justified in waging pre-emptive warfare. It
will then ask whether conditions in Iraq and the foreseeable
success of an invasion justified the United States' humanitarian
resort to arms. Part I will lay the conceptual and moral
foundation of just war theory. It will also show how that
(1999) [hereinafter Johnson, Thinking Morally], available at http://www.pacem.no/
1999/2/pdf; infra Part I.C.
This Article will not address the just war implications of the war in
Afghanistan or what the Bush administration referred to as the global "War on
Terror." See generally JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, JUST WAR AGAINST TERROR: THE
BURDEN OF AMERICAN POWER IN A VIOLENT WORLD (2003). I will refer to the war
conducted in January and February of 1991 to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait as the
"Persian Gulf War." When referring to the War initiated in March of 2003 to
institute "regime change" in Iraq, I will use the expressions "War in Iraq," "Iraq
War," or simply, "the War."
5 Iraq did not, in fact, possess these weapons in 2003, and whether it ever
sought them in the decade preceding the invasion has been called into serious doubt.
For example, the much-hyped "mobile biological laboratories" never materialized;
and aluminum tubes, allegedly intended for uranium centrifuges, turned out to be
artillery shell components. See David Barstow, How White House Embraced Suspect
Iraq Arms Intelligence, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2004, at 1; Joby Warrick, Lacking
Biolabs, Trailers Carried Case for War, WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 2006, at Al. I will
attempt, however, to evaluate the United States' resort to war-particularly with
respect to its pre-emption case-in light of what was known and widely believed
before the invasion rather than what turned out to be the case afterward.
6 See generally Lawrence F. Kaplan, Regime Change, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 3,
2003, at 21.
1 The basic inquiry is two-fold, comprising the jus ad bellum (the "right to make
war"-that is, the conditions under which it is morally justifiable to initiate or enter
armed conflict) and the jus in bello (the "law of war"-that is, moral restraints once
armed conflict has begun). See JAMES TURNER JOHNSON, JUST WAR TRADITION AND
THE RESTRAINT OF WAR: A MORAL AND HISTORICAL INQUIRY xxii-xxiii (1981). See
infra Part II.A for a more complete discussion of the criteria traditionally falling
under each of these concepts.
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foundation can serve as the moral justification for humanitarian
intervention. Part II will discuss the traditional just war criteria
of just cause, right authority, overall proportionality, and
reasonable hope of success. It will also relate these criteria to
pre-emptive warfare and describe how they must be uniquely
understood in the context of humanitarian intervention. Part III
will apply the criteria to critique the moral justifications for
invading and occupying Iraq.
I. FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES: JUST WAR AND JUST
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
Just war's analytical framework, while developed over
centuries primarily to address the moral problems of
symmetrical conflicts-whether between kingdoms or nation-
states-can also evaluate humanitarian intervention. In
particular, just war's respect for the human community and
conviction that war may at times be required to vindicate the
Christian law of love make just humanitarian intervention a
moral possibility. These principles are not innovative in just war
theory, but are, in fact, evident in some of the tradition's oldest
thought.
A. Natural Law Principles as the Foundation for Morally
Evaluating War
To understand just war theory, one must also understand
general principles of Catholic natural law theory, particularly as
they relate to human communality. In Catholic thought, God
gave human beings, upon creation, access to God's eternal law.'
Through likewise divinely endowed faculties of reason, and aided
by scriptural revelation, humankind can know and use this
eternal law to guide its decisions in matters where its will is
free.' Absent this guidance, human beings cannot live in
harmony with their own natures, in domestic society, or
" See G. E. M. Anscombe, The Justice of the Present War Examined, in WAR IN
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: SOURCES IN THEOLOGICAL ETHICS 125, 126 (Richard B.
Miller ed., 1992).
9 See id. ("Aquinas called [the process of discovering the natural law through
reason] 'the participation in the eternal law of the rational creature.'").
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internationally; through conformity to it, human beings can
properly fulfill their nature, as individuals and collectively, in the
manner ordained by God.'0
Just war theory presupposes this communal understanding
of human fulfillment when morally evaluating war." Just war
posits that, if human beings are ordained to a common good, they
therefore have a mandate to organize to defend that good from
attack.12 The process of just war reasoning, then, is the process
of inquiring whether, in the conduct of defending that good,
humanity is observing the natural law. 3
B. Making War Moral: Charting a Middle Way to Peace
By thus applying moral reasoning to the conduct of war, just
war theory purports to reject the simplistic-or even
sentimental-assumptions of pacifism on the one hand and the
amorality and cynicism of political realism on the other. In the
estimate of John Courtney Murray, Christian pacifism is "an
unqualified embrace of the principle of non-violence." 4 Pacifism
rejects any use of force or violence as immoral because force and
violence contravene the Christian law of love as embodied in the
Sermon on the Mount.'5 In sharp contrast to absolute pacifism,
political realism bases its notion of good statecraft on national
self-interest and, thus, employs force whenever it serves that
10 See id. at 125-26.
n See Robert L. Phillips, Reply to Professor Cady, in ROBERT L. PHILLIPS &
DUANE L. CADY, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: JUST WAR VS. PACIFISM 77, 78
(1996).
12 See id.
13 See Anscombe, supra note 8.
14 JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS
ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION 238 (Image Books 1964).
1 Id. The relevant passage reads:
You have heard that it was said, "An eye for an eye and a tooth for a
tooth." But I say to you, Do not resist an evildoer. But if anyone strikes you
on the right cheek, turn the other also ....
You have heard that it was said, "You shall love your neighbor and hate
your enemy." But I say to you, Love your enemies and pray for those who
persecute you, so that you may be children of your Father in heaven.
Matthew 5:38-39, 43-45 (NRSV).
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interest.'6  In the realist worldview, moral analysis is largely
irrelevant" and brutality and political violence may be
acceptable means to the end of maintaining national power.' 8
Despite these apparent differences, however, Murray points
out that at the root of pacifism and realism there is a common
presupposition: an "antinomy between war and morality.""
Essentially, both attitudes perceive a total moral rupture
between war and peace, whereby morality, confined wholly to the
world of peace, completely evaporates as soon as there is war."
Just war theory rejects this dichotomy as not only false, but
dangerous, because it represents an "abdication of the moral
reason" that humans must always employ to the end of human
fulfillment.2 ' Instead, by its reasoning process, just war attaches
morality to war and seeks to safeguard what peace remains in
war's event.22
While just war theory shares with pacifism a recognition of
the Christian law of love, it diverges from pacifism in its
recognition that this law not only permits the use of force, but
may require it. Paul Ramsey compellingly illustrates this
recognition by reference to the parable of the Good Samaritan
who, moved with pity after coming upon the wounded traveler on
the road to Jericho, bandaged him, carried him to an inn, and
paid the innkeeper to shelter him. 23 Ramsey asks whether, in
addition to this "ambulance theory of Christian charity," it might
also be an act of charity "to maintain and serve in a police force
along the Jericho road to prevent such things from happening to
travelers."24 More provocatively, Ramsey asks, "What do you
imagine Jesus would have had the Samaritan do if in the story
16 See Johnson, Thinking Morally, supra note 3, at 185.
17 See John Kelsey, 'Just War': The Details, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 10, 2002, at C1.
Theoretically, from a realist perspective, moral analysis could be relevant in
determining, for example, whether the use of force would rouse domestic or
international political opposition.
18 See ELSHTAIN, supra note 4, at 56.
19 MURRAY, supra note 14, at 253.
20 See id. at 256-57.
21 See id. at 254.
22 See id. at 257.
23 See Luke 10:25-37 (NRSV).
24 Paul Ramsey, Is Vietnam a Just War?, in WAR IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY:
SOURCES IN THEOLOGICAL ETHICS, supra note 8, at 185, 185. While Ramsey is
himself not a Catholic, nevertheless, he writes within and contributes to the just war
tradition. See James F. Childress, Just-War Criteria, in WAR IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY: SOURCES IN THEOLOGICAL ETHICS, supra note 8, at 351, 355.
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he had come upon the scene when the robbers had just begun
their attack and while they were still at their fell work?"25 The
use of force under this circumstance does not violate the
Christian will to peace; rather, it is an affirmation of that will
because without justice, law, and order, there cannot be peace.2 6
Finally, just war theory seeks to account for the nature of the
human world. Because the world is fallen, human beings cannot
perfect governance. 27  And yet Christians, unless they are to
withdraw into ascetic isolation, must assume the burden of
earthly rule without condemning its methods outright-instead
accepting that resort to them may be necessary.28 One of these
methods is warfare; and, so, anyone assuming authority must be
prepared to resort to it-though only in a manner in keeping
with Christian morality.29
C. The Move to Humanitarian Intervention: The Moral
Obligation To Intervene
The communal goods toward which humanity is ordained
belong exclusively to no one and may make it morally imperative
that one state interfere in the internal affairs of another state.3 0
Moreover, human beings cannot fulfill these goods on the
individual level, but must do so in communion, even
internationally." For within nation-states, communal fulfillment
25 Ramsey, supra note 24, at 186.
26 See MURRAY, supra note 14, at 246-47.
27 See ELSHTAIN, supra note 4, at 51.
28 See id. at 51, 56.
29 See id. at 52, 56. Elshtain reaches this conclusion in part by reference to
Jesus' exhortation, "Give ... to the emperor the things that are the emperor's, and to
God the things that are God's," Matthew 22:21 (NRSV), and Paul's, "Let every
person be subject to the governing authorities," Romans 13:1. See ELSHTAIN, supra
note 4, at 51-52; see also Robert P. George, Just War in Iraq, AMERICANVALUES.ORG
(Dec. 2002), http://www.americanvalues.org/html/1b-robert-george.html ("It is a
tragic fact of human affairs that sometimes statesmen cannot fulfill their moral
duties to prevent aggression and resist tyranny relying exclusively on diplomatic or
other non-military means.").
'o See Robert L. Phillips, The Ethics of Humanitarian Intervention, in
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: JUST WAR VS. PACIFISM, supra note 11, at 1, 10
[hereinafter Phillips, Humanitarian Intervention].
" See id. ("For Christianity, all men are creations of the same Father and spring
from the same primordial parents. Human fate is thus tied to this intimacy of
communion. There are no foreigners."). As expressed by the United States
Conference of Catholic Bishops: "[H]uman life, human rights and the welfare of the
human community are at the center of Catholic moral reflection on the social and
political order. Geography and political divisions do not alter the fact that we are all
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can be realized by the internal polis; however, there is no global
polis, and so responsibility for achieving global communion may
fall to civilized states acting supranationally.3 2 This
responsibility to achieve and safeguard such basic human goods
can, potentially, demand armed intervention against the
territory of other states where there are major violations of
justice or humanitarian need.33  As Pope John Paul II wrote-
linking the achievement of communal good to safeguarding and
protecting human rights:
[A]n offense against human rights is ... an offence [sic] against
humanity itself. The duty of protecting these rights therefore
extends beyond the geographical and political borders within
which they are violated. Crimes against humanity cannot be
considered an internal affair of a nation.... We must thank
God that in the conscience of peoples and nations there is a
growing conviction that human rights have no borders, because
they are universal and indivisible.34
When these human rights, said John Paul, are imperiled on
a large-scale, "it is legitimate and even obligatory to take concrete
measures to disarm the aggressor."3 5
The view that circumstances may require armed action in
defense of other nations is an admixture of the Christian law of
love and a realistic appraisal of the realities of peace. As
discussed in relation to the parable of the Good Samaritan, the
law of love can be interpreted to require force, particularly when
it is necessary to defend one's neighbor from brutality.3 6
Internally, this requirement falls to the public authorities, who
must at times resort to force to safeguard the good of their
community from attack37 ; love of neighbor, however, goes further,
one human family, and indifference to the suffering of members of that family is not
a moral option." UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, The Harvest of
Justice is Sown in Peace, § 2.E.4 (1993) [hereinafter USCCB Letter], available at
http://www.usccb.org/beliefs-and-teachings/what-we-believe/catholic-social-teaching/
the-harvest-of-justice-is-sown-in-peace.cfm.
32 See Phillips, Humanitarian Intervention, supra note 30, at 11.
" Johnson, Thinking Morally, supra note 3, at 184.
3 POPE JOHN PAUL II, MESSAGE FOR THE CELEBRATION OF THE WORLD DAY OF
PEACE: PEACE ON EARTH TO THOSE WHOM GOD LovEs! 1 7 (Jan. 1, 2000), (emphasis
omitted), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/john paul-ii/messages/
peace/documents/hfjp-ii mes_08121999_xxxiii-world-day-for-peacesen.html.
1 Id. 9 11 (emphasis added).
3 See supra text accompanying notes 23-26.
37 See Coverdale, supra note 2, at 226.
83
JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 51:77
possibly requiring public authorities to employ force on behalf of
neighboring communities whose common good is imperiled by
internal circumstances." In determining whether such action is
necessary, leaders cannot sacrifice justice to false notions of
peace.39 For, while resorting to warfare is always morally tragic,
permitting massive crimes and injustices may be more so.40
Under these disordered circumstances-which are endemic in a
broken world-more lives may be lost in "peace" than in warfare,
morally obliging nations to sacrifice peace when doing so is
necessary to restore justice.4 1
While from one perspective, this view appears to be an
innovation, it is supported by some of the most ancient just war
thinking. For example, in St. Augustine's view, rooted in
conceptions of charity, it was love that motivated one,
encountering an evil assailant about to assault an innocent
victim, to protect the victim. 42 St. Augustine's view was shared
by St. Ambrose and St. Thomas Aquinas. Applied on an
international scale, this conception represents, in fact, less of an
innovation than it does a pre-Westphalian conception of the
universal community of mankind, one transcending nation-state
boundaries." Thus, in direct contrast to notions of inviolable
domestic sovereignty, the earliest manifestations of just war
thought obliged Christian rulers to remedy systematic injustices
in neighboring realms. 5
38 See ELSHTAIN, supra note 4, at 54 (describing the necessity, in the context of
failed states such as Somalia, to resort to force "to stop predators from killing and
starving people outright"); supra text accompanying notes 33-35.
39 See ELSHTAIN, supra note 4, at 54; see also id. at 56 ("For pacifists, the
reigning word is peace.... For just war thinkers, the reigning word is justice.").
o See id. at 54.
" See id. at 50-51; supra text accompanying notes 27-29.
42 See JOHNSON, supra note 7, at 6-7. The United States Conference of Catholic
Bishops refers to this scenario as "St. Augustine's classic case: love may require force
to protect the innocent." See USCCB Letter, supra note 31, § 2.E.4; see also
ELSHTAIN, supra note 4, at 57 (describing St. Augustine's view that force may be
justified to "protect[] the innocent from certain harm").
43 See ELSHTAIN, supra note 4, at 51.
" See Coverdale, supra note 2, at 239.
" See Phillips, Humanitarian Intervention, supra note 30, at 12.
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II. JUST WAR CRITERIA IN PRE-EMPTION AND HUmANITARIAN
INTERVENTION
To aid rulers in applying just war theory's foundational
precepts, the just war process employs traditional criteria to
determine whether going to war is morally justified or required.
Broadly, these criteria fall into two categories: jus ad bellum
criteria governing the decision to engage in warfare and jus in
bello criteria governing military conduct once hostilities have
begun.4 6 This Article will concern itself primarily with jus ad
bellum criteria.4 7
A. Traditional Jus Ad Bellum Criteria
Just war theorists formulate jus ad bellum criteria in
different but similar ways48 ; nevertheless, a survey reveals a
general consensus. The first three criteria are considered
foundational. They are, in Samuel Turner Johnson's
formulation: "right authority, historically understood as
sovereign political authority, that which has no superior; just
cause, classically defined as defense against attack, recovery of
persons and property wrongly taken, and punishment of evil;
[and] right intention."9 In addition to these foundational
criteria, theorists have developed three prudential criteria in
light of history and experience. They are: "overall
proportionality, [requiring] that a judgment be made that the
good done by the resort to force will outweigh the evil; reasonable
hope of success, a calculation of likelihood that the resort to force
46 See JOHNSON, supra note 7, at 6-7.
'7 One formulation articulates four jus in bello criteria: (1) the immediate aim of
combat must be to incapacitate, not to kill-thus necessitating humane treatment of
prisoners of war; (2) direct attacks against non-combatants are absolutely
prohibited; (3) infliction of unnecessary suffering (for example, through the use of
"dum-dum" rounds-that is, hollow-point bullets) and destruction are prohibited;
and (4) incidental loss of non-combatant life must be justified by the objectives
achieved in combat. See Childress, supra note 24, at 362-63.
* See Johnson, Thinking Morally, supra note 3, at 182 (articulating six jus ad
bellum criteria). But see James Turner Johnson, Just-War Tradition and the War in
the Gulf, in WAR IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: SOURCES IN THEOLOGICAL ETHICS,
supra note 8, at 449, 449 [hereinafter Johnson, Just-War Tradition] (articulating
seven jus ad bellum criteria); see also Childress, supra note 24, at 359 (including the
requirement of a formal declaration of war).
49 Johnson, Thinking Morally, supra note 3, at 182. Right intention "is shaped
by the pursuit of a just cause [and] also encompasses motives. For example, as
Augustine ... [has] insisted, hatred is ruled out." Childress, supra note 24, at 360.
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would achieve its just purposes; and last resort."so This Article
will concern itself primarily with the criteria of right authority,
just cause, overall proportionality, and reasonable hope of
success.
B. Jus Ad Bellum Criteria and Pre-Emptive War: Contemporary
Considerations
1. Just Cause
Just war theory does not always require nations to await
actual attack before resorting to force; rather, nations may
sometimes, as a form of self-defense, strike the first blow to
prevent a threatened attack.5 1 The requirement that a nation, to
be justified in waging war, have not fired the first shot is
relatively new-traceable to the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the
United Nations Charter; just war theory has accepted the
possibility of pre-emptive force since the time of St. Augustine.5 2
For example, Grotius, writing in the seventeenth century,
condoned military action against "an injury not yet inflicted [but]
which menaces either persons or property."53
Nevertheless, the right has traditionally been circumscribed,
licensing pre-emptive force against only truly imminent threats.5 4
Grotius, while sanctioning the possibility of pre-emptive force,
rejected the proposition that "the bare possibility that violence
may be some day turned on us gives us the right to inflict
violence on others."5 5  Rather, to justify pre-emptive force, just
war theory requires a high likelihood of a serious and imminent
50 Johnson, Thinking Morally, supra note 3, at 182. The requirement of last
resort does not obligate states to exhaust literally every non-violent means-a nearly
impossible demand; rather, states must reasonably exhaust all available non-violent
means. Id.
6' See REGAN, supra note 3, at 51.
52 See JOHNSON, supra note 7, at 30.
1 Coverdale, supra note 2, at 242.
*4 See James Turner Johnson, Using Military Force Against the Saddam
Hussein Regime: The Moral Issues, FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE (Dec. 4,
2002) [hereinafter Johnson, The Moral Issue], http://www.fpri.org/enotes/america
war.20021204.johnson.militaryagainsthusseinmoralissues.html ("[Pireemption is
inherently neither wrong nor right, but it is extremely difficult to justify. There must
be a clear and present danger.").
5 Coverdale, supra note 2, at 243.
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attack, one that is unlikely to be averted by means short of war.5 6
Just war theory distinguishes legitimate pre-emptive force
against a grave and imminent menace from less legitimate
preventive force against a distant danger-for example, a
nascent threat that may eventually erode a balance of power and
lead to instability. 7 Such preventive wars are harder to justify
because, while war is bound to be costly in terms of human life
and material destruction, the speculative danger of a nascent
threat may never materialize, or may be warded off by means
short of war.
Some just war theorists have argued that the imminence
requirement should, in response to contemporary strategic
realities, be defined more widely. Theorists developed the
imminence requirement at a time when military buildups were
more clearly identifiable-for example, large-scale mobilization of
troops at borders."9 In the present era, acquisition of NBC
weaponry by so-called "rogue states"-nations that have already
established their aggressive intent and that cannot be expected
to conform to international norms-has complicated matters."
States can develop NBC weaponry in secret and, once it is
obtained, its destructiveness in combination with a regime's
already known aggressive intentions might mean that the time
for defense will have passed.6 1 Thus, in these circumstances, an
' See REGAN, supra note 3, at 52 ("[Tihe justice of a preemptive strike requires
that the would-be victim nation have moral certitude about the hostile intentions of
the putative would-be aggressor nation, and that the targets of the preemptive
strike pose a credible threat to the would-be victim nation's security."); David
Blankenhorn et al., Pre-Emption, Iraq, and Just War: A Statement of Principles,
AMERICANVALUES.ORG (Nov. 14, 2002), http://www.americanvalues.org/html/
lb-pre-emptionp.html ("[Pire-emption can be morally justified only in rare
circumstances-when the attack is likely to be imminent, the threat is grave, and
preventive means other than war are unavailable.").
" See Coverdale, supra note 2, at 243; Michael Walzer, Inspectors Yes, War No.
No Strikes, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 30, 2002, at 19, 21.
1 Walzer, supra note 57, at 21 ("[J]ust-war theorists have never looked on th[e]
argument [for preventive war] with favor because the danger to which it alludes is
not only distant but speculative, whereas the costs of a preventive war are near,
certain, and usually terrible.").
6* See Joe Feuerherd, Preemption, Aggression, and Catholic Teaching, NAT'L
CATH. REP., Oct. 25, 2002, at 13.
6 See Brad Roberts, NBC-Armed Rogues: Is There a Moral Case for
Preemption?, in CLOSE CALLS: INTERVENTION, TERRORISM, MISSILE DEFENSE, AND
"JUST WAR" TODAY 83, 92 (Elliott Abrams ed., 1998).
61 See Walzer, supra note 57, at 20.
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imminent threat may exist even before NBC weaponry has been
acquired, provided the "rogue" regime is developing and likely to
use it."
2. Right Authority
While right authority to wage war traditionally vested in the
highest authority of a particular nation, in the pre-emption
context it may vest in supranational bodies.63  Because pre-
emptive action necessarily involves responding to indistinct
threats, right authority is morally essential. 64  This imperative
arises from the danger that a state may exploit pre-emption in
pursuit of its own narrow self-interest and at other states'
expense, arrogating to itself the unilateral right to determine
when a threat is imminent and, in effect, putting itself above the
law. 5 Yet just war theory adopted the right authority
requirement to prevent the domestic social chaos of brigands' and
minor nobles' raising armies and waging private wars.6 6 Today, a
nation's claiming the right unilaterally to determine when a
speculative threat has given rise to the necessity of pre-emption
risks elevating that domestic chaos to the international level. 7
For this reason, deferring the authority to make that
determination to international bodies-and the United Nations
in particular-may be necessary to establish the moral right to
wage pre-emptive war.68
62 See Roberts, supra note 60 ("The acquisition of weapons of mass
destruction. . . can confirm an intent to injure, create a positive danger, and raise
the risks of waiting."); Feuerherd, supra note 59 ("[Imminent threat] may refer ... to
murderous capabilities an outlaw regime is in the process of developing[,] [ilf one
can make a strong case that the use of such capabilities is highly likely.") (quoting
Jean Bethke Elshtain, A Just War?, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 6, 2002, available at
http://www.americanvalues.org/html/elshtainjustwar.html); George, supra note 29
("Pre-emptive action is 'defensive' when it is motivated by a reasonable belief that a
proven aggressor is in the process of equipping himself with the military means to
carry out further aggression with impunity.").
* See Coverdale, supra note 2, at 248, 252-53.
* That is, indistinct in comparison to an open attack by one nation against
another. See Roberts, supra note 60, at 97.
* See id. at 97-98. Presumably, there is less likelihood of a nation's exploiting
the right to self-defense in the event of open., demonstrable aggression.
6 See Coverdale, supra note 2, at 248.
67 See generally Blankenhorn et al., supra note 56 (describing the danger of
licensing states to unilaterally initiate wars in the absence of an actual attack).
6 See Roberts, supra note 60, at 96, 101-02 ("[The United Nations] is the only
institution that aspires to represent the interests of the whole community of nations,
and thus the only one with strong moral authority in purporting to defend those
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3. The Remaining Prudential Criteria
The remaining jus ad bellum criteria also take on unique
characteristics in the pre-emption context. States considering
pre-emptive action must carefully consider the criteria of
reasonable chance of success and overall proportionality in light
of the fact that no attack has occurred." In such an instance,
there is a lack of certainty about the measures a would-be
aggressor might take in retaliation; furthermore, there is a lack
of certainty as to what harm pre-emptive action will avert, and
whether that harm would have been greater or lesser than the
inevitable destruction and hardship of war.o
C. Jus Ad Bellum Criteria and Humanitarian Intervention
1. Just Cause
The suffering of innocents at the hands of aggressors in other
states justifies resort to force as a subset of the classical just
cause of defense against attack." The justness of resorting to
force in this instance originates in the obligation to defend the
innocent in one's own community from unjust external
aggression.72 Because of the universal nature of human good,
this obligation of defense can extend to an obligation to defend
the innocent in neighboring communities from internal
aggression.73  Thus, defending innocent parties from unjust
interests."). But see George Weigel, The Just War Tradition and the World After
September 11, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 689, 712 (2002) ("The manifest inability of the
United Nations to handle large-scale international security questions suggests that
assigning a moral veto over [pre-emptive] U.S. military action . .. to the Security
Council would be a mistake.").
69 See Roberts, supra note 60, at 87.
70 See id.; Walzer, supra note 57.
71 See Johnson, Thinking Morally, supra note 3, at 182; supra text
accompanying note 49.
72 See Coverdale, supra note 2, at 226; supra text accompanying note 38.
7 See ELSHTAIN, supra note 4, at 150 ("[T]he just war tradition ... holds that
the governments and citizens of one country may be called upon to protect citizens of
another country, or a minority within that country, who are not in a position to
defend themselves from harm."); supra text accompanying note 39.
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aggression can be added to the traditional formulations of just
cause. 74 An example of such intervention would be preventing a
state from carrying out genocide against an internal minority.75
In addition, aggression against innocents in neighboring
states by their own regime can furnish just cause as a subset of
punishment of evil, another classic source of just cause."
Punishment of evil was the principle justification for war in
Thomist just war theory.7 In its contemporary understanding,
punishment of evil takes the form of righting wrongs and, in
particular, defending human rights. This justification for resort
to force can rise to the level of a duty to undertake armed
humanitarian intervention to depose and replace regimes as a
punishment for gross violations of their citizens' human rights. 9
2. Remaining Criteria in Contemporary Humanitarian
Intervention
Grave humanitarian emergency, however, does not of itself
warrant intervention, and before resorting to force a state must
carefully consider all the ramifications of taking action.80  This
caution arises in part from the nature of war itself: A state must
appreciate that war is likely to have far-reaching consequences,
consequences that may not be readily apparent in advance of
hostilities."' Pope John Paul II, for example, even while decrying
the 20th Century's "endless and horrifying sequence
of.. . genocides and 'ethnic cleansings,'" nevertheless warned,
"[W]ars are often the cause of further wars [and
74 See ELSHTAIN, supra note 4, at 57-58 (formulating just cause as responding
"to a specific instance of unjust aggression perpetrated against one's own people or
an innocent third party").
* See id. at 57.
6 See Coverdale, supra note 2, at 229-230; Johnson, Thinking Morally, supra
note 3, at 182.
17 See Coverdale, supra note 2, at 230.
78 See id.
7 See Johnson, The Moral Issues, supra note 54 (suggesting that regimes may
"deserve] to be deposed and replaced because of their evil behavior").
s See Johnson, Thinking Morally, supra note 3, at 184 ("[There are] serious
limits on what at first looks to be virtually an out-and-out moral argument for
military intervention as a response to injustice whenever and wherever it appears.
There are times when, despite the presence of grave injustice, good statecraft may
require a decision against intervention.").
" See MURRAY, supra note 14, at 250 (noting that the just war calculus must
pay due regard "for the tinderbox character of our world in which a spark may set off
a conflagration").
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they] . . . generally do not resolve the problems for which they are
fought and therefore, in addition to causing horrendous damage,
they prove ultimately futile."8 2
For this reason, the state's moral obligation does not
conclude at determination of the justness of its cause and
rightness of its intention; its obligations extend to judicious
consideration of the prudential jus ad bellum criteria." With
respect to overall proportionality, a state must examine whether
intervening in a given situation will ultimately do more harm
than good-that is, whether intervening will ultimately give rise
to more violence and suffering than that intended to be averted.84
This is because, while attempting to avert a harm of one kind,
the state may inadvertently unleash forces of far greater
destructive potential." Moreover, the state must exercise careful
judgment about its chances of success-whether, for instance, the
people intended to be benefited actually welcome intervention or
will resist the efforts of the intervener." For history has shown
that the benevolent aspirations of the intervening state may not
resonate with the local population, and that even the best of
intentions cannot substitute for operational competence.
From these practical realities, certain cautionary principles
emerge. With respect to probability of success, states must be
realistic about the extent to which they can actually help their
neighbors. 8 Interveners will have the highest chance of success
on missions with narrowly defined, readily achievable objectives
that enjoy broad support among the local population." Thus,
while Pope John Paul II spoke of nations' "duty" to protect the
human rights of persons beyond their borders, he nevertheless
82 POPE JOHN PAUL II, supra note 34, T[ 3.
' See Johnson, Thinking Morally, supra note 3, at 190.
8 See id. at 191 ("Every act of intervention has wide-ranging consequences.").
" See REGAN, supra note 3, at 70 ("[I]ntervention for humanitarian
reasons ... might provoke a major war.").
8 See id.
8 See Phillips, Humanitarian Intervention, supra note 30, at 3 ("Vietnam and
Afghanistan turned sour when the would-be beneficiaries of intervention proved
ungrateful or uncomprehending.... [Tihere is often a very large gap between the
(sometimes) good intentions of the interveners and the carrying out of an
operation.").
88 See REGAN, supra note 3, at 72 ("The world community should ... resist the
Messianic temptation to right every wrong without regard to short- and long-term
consequences.").
89 See id. at 71-72.
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cautioned that any measures of intervention should "be limited
in time and precise in their aims."90 Additionally, and as has
been mentioned, with respect to overall proportionality, states
should be mindful of the harms that might issue from armed
intervention, and whether those harms will outweigh the evil to
be averted.91  For example, theorists frequently offer the
prevention of genocide as a scenario in which the good done-in
terms of lives saved-will likely outweigh the violence
unleashed.9 2 On the other hand, where a repressive regime has
merely engaged in a pattern of human rights abuses, there is a
distinct possibility that military intervention will produce more
death and suffering than the regime itself can inflict.93
In the context of humanitarian intervention, right authority
may vest in supranational bodies and, in particular, the United
Nations. Sanctioning humanitarian intervention in principle
risks states' taking it upon themselves to embark on "endless
wars of altruism" as a pretext for advancing their imperialistic
self-interest.9 4  The possibility of such disingenuousness may
hinder the success of humanitarian intervention by
delegitimizing an intervener's mission in the eyes of the
population meant to be benefited."5 Even where a state acts out
of genuine concern for the local population, it risks being
9 POPE JOHN PAUL II, supra note 34, at [[ 7, 11.
91 See supra text accompanying notes 84-85.
" See, e.g., ELSHTAIN, supra note 4, at 51 (suggesting that, had genocides been
confronted on the battlefield earlier, "fewer lives would have been lost over the long
run"); John P. Langan, S.J., Humanitarian Intervention: From Concept to Reality, in
CLOSE CALLS: INTERVENTION, TERRORISM, MISSILE DEFENSE, AND "JUST WAR"
TODAY, supra note 60, at 109, 109 (making the case that preventing genocide by a
repressive regime will likely satisfy the test of overall proportionality). Preventing
genocide may satisfy the requirement of overall proportionality because, as John
Courtney Murray has said, that determination calculates not just "physical death
and destruction," but also "human goods of so high an order that immense sacrifices
may have to be borne in their defense"; this is "the moral calculus that is enjoined in
the traditional theory of rebellion against tyranny." Murray, supra note 14, at 249-
50.
* See Langan, supra note 92, at 123; Andrew Natsios, Complex Humanitarian
Emergencies and Moral Choice, in CLOSE CALLS: INTERVENTION, TERRORISM,
MISSILE DEFENSE, AND "JUST WAR" TODAY, supra note 60, at 125, 132 ("Violating a
person's right to a fair trial and committing genocide are both human-rights abuses,
but they are of a profoundly different character. The United States cannot guarantee
the former outside its own borders; the latter it can, as a matter of policy, actively
oppose.").
9 USCCB Letter, supra note 31, § 2.E.4.
9s See Phillips, Humanitarian Intervention, supra note 30, at 11.
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incapable of objectively evaluating the jus ad bellum criteria, an
analysis that can be better undertaken in an objective
international forum.96 Finally, because the United Nations
aspires to represent the interests of the international community,
it possesses the moral authority to authorize war outside of the
rubric of strict self-defense. For these reasons, Pope John Paul
II cautioned that, before embarking on humanitarian
intervention, states should make "[t]he fullest and the best
use ... of all the provisions of the United Nations Charter.""
Moreover, states should, when contemplating intervention, use
the opportunity as one for strengthening international
cooperation and institutions rather than weakening them.99
III. JUST WAR AND THE WAR IN IRAQ
Evaluated on the basis of these principles, the United States'
invasion of Iraq in March, 2003 may not have satisfied the just
war tradition's jus ad bellum requirements. The Hussein
regime's treatment of its citizenry and international agression
may have been sufficiently unconscionable to furnish just cause
for an invasion on grounds of humanitarian intervention. It is
only debatable, however, whether the threat posed by the
Hussein regime was sufficiently imminent and defined to furnish
just cause for pre-emption. With respect to both pre-emption and
humanitarian intervention, the lack of international support-
particularly from the United Nations and considering the United
States' tepid efforts to gain support there-suggests that America
may not have possessed right authority to go to war." And
finally, with respect to both pre-emption and humanitarian
intervention, it is doubtful that there was sufficient probability of
success, or that there was adequate potential of overall
proportionality, to justify war.
A. Iraq: Humanitarian Intervention and Just Cause
Saddam Hussein's regime exhibited moral blameworthiness
in both its domestic and international conduct. It is estimated
that the purges that followed Hussein's consolidation of power in
9 See id. ("Just as an individual is not a proper judge in his own case, so a
nation is not either.").
9 See REGAN, supra note 3, at 72-73; Roberts, supra note 60, at 92.
98 POPE JOHN PAUL II, supra note 34, 1 11.
9 See USCCB Letter, supra note 31, § 2.E.4.
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1979 resulted in the deaths of at least 500 political opponents,
and Hussein employed imprisonment, torture, execution, and
deprivation of civil liberties to maintain control over the rest of
the population thereafter.100 Shortly after taking power, in 1980,
Hussein initiated a war of aggression against neighboring Iran
that, upon its termination without appreciable success, had cost
the lives of 200,000 Iraqis, wounded hundreds of thousands more,
and taken a similar toll on Iran. o' In 1982, after an
assassination attempt on Hussein, his regime terrorized and
oppressed citizens of the Shiite town of Dujail, executing some
148 men and boys without trial.102 In 1988, at the close of the
war with Iran, Hussein ordered a mustard gas attack against the
Kurdish town of Halabja that killed approximately 5,000
civilians, including women and children, and wounded 10,000
more.103  In 1990, Iraq again initiated a war of aggression,
invading Kuwait without provocation.104  Afterward, Iraq
expropriated Kuwait's oil fields; announced its annexation of
Kuwait; terrorized Kuwaiti civilians with acts of murder, rape,
and torture; and launched indiscriminate Scud missile attacks
against Israel.105 At the close of the Persian Gulf War to expel
Iraq from Kuwait, once the United States and coalition forces
had abandoned their posture of aggression, Hussein brutally
crushed uprisings by Shiites and Kurds." Following the war,
Iraq suffered under a sanctions regime tied to arms control
agreements.'0 7 Though Iraq was entitled to trade oil for aid in
the form of food and medicine, Hussein siphoned funds from the
100 See Neil MacFarquhar, Saddam Hussein, Defiant Dictator Who Ruled Iraq
with Violence and Fear, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2006, at A10.
101 See id.
'2 This, in fact, was the offense for which Hussein would later be sentenced to
death. See John F. Burns & Kirk Semple, Hussein Is Sentenced to Death by Hanging,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2006, at Al.
10' See MacFarquhar, supra note 100.
104 See JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS,
PROCESS 837 (3d ed. 2010).
1" See id. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait had the effect of alleviating Iraq's enormous
debt to Kuwait, incurred as a result of its war with Iran; putting Iraq in the position
of controlling all of Kuwait's oil wealth and, potentially, billions of dollars of Kuwaiti
assets held in foreign banks; signaling to other nations in the region that non-
compliance with Iraqi oil price policies would come with consequences; and giving
Iraq access to the Persian Gulf. See id. at 837-38. The Persian Gulf War has been
estimated to have cost the lives of 150,000 Iraqis. See MacFarquhar, supra note 100.
' See MacFarquhar, supra note 100.
1'0 See id.
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program to strengthen his control apparatus, thus depriving his
citizens of desperately needed resources. All the while, the
regime continued to imprison, torture, and murder its people. 0 9
In the run up to the 2003 war, the United States repeatedly
invoked these conditions, and the prospect of alleviating them by
establishing a democratic government in Iraq, to justify
overthrowing the Hussein regime.1 o The Bush administration
announced the spread of democracy as one of the principle
elements of its national security strategy."' Additionally, in
justifying an invasion as moral, the United States argued that
after it removed Hussein, it would democratize Iraq, a step that
would lead to further political and economic liberalization in the
rest of the Middle East.112 This justification played a significant
role in garnering support for the war among the United States'
political left.113
Under these circumstances, it would be difficult to argue
that there was not just cause for humanitarian intervention in
defense of the people of Iraq, or else to punish the evils
perpetrated by the Hussein regime. States must defend their
citizens from attack, and natural law principles, together with
Christian obligations of charity, extend this obligation to defense
of persons in other nations endangered by internal threats."4
Moreover, punishment of evil is one of the most ancient
justifications for war; and in contemporary understanding, this
justification includes punishing the repeated human rights
abuses of oppressive regimes.' Hussein's government, over the
course of almost twenty-five years, repeatedly engaged in such
'o' See ELSHTAIN, supra note 4, at 87-88; MacFarquhar, supra note 100.
109 See MacFarquhar, supra note 100.
110 See infra notes 111-113 and accompanying text.
'x' See U.S. SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 1, at iii ("Freedom is the non-
negotiable demand of human dignity; the birthright of every person-in every
civilization.").
112 See Kaplan, supra note 6 (quoting President George W. Bush as saying,
"Liberty for the Iraqi people is a great moral cause"); David E. Sanger, A New
Doctrine for War, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2003, at Al [hereinafter Sanger, A New
Doctrine] (quoting an address by Bush to the Iraqi people: "In a free Iraq ... there
will be no more wars of aggression against your neighbors, no more poison factories,
no more executions of dissidents, no more torture chambers and rape rooms. The
tyrant will soon be gone. The day of your liberation is near."); Paul Starr, Editorial,
A War for Democracy?, AM. PROSPECT, Apr., 2003, at 3.
n. See Kaplan, supra note 6, at 21; Starr, supra note 112.
114 See supra Part I.C.
1n, See supra text accompanying notes 76-78.
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abuses-he was known as one of the most brutal autocrats of the
modern era.116 Thus, the United States likely satisfied the just
cause requirement for humanitarian intervention in Iraq.
B. Iraq: Pre-Emption and Just Cause
The argument that pre-emptive necessity furnished just
cause for a war with Iraq is less strong. In the 1980s, Hussein's
regime engaged in efforts to develop NBC weaponry." It is
known, for example, that Hussein employed chemical weapons
against his own population and built a nuclear reactor at
Osirik."11  During the Persian Gulf War, Hussein refrained from
using such weaponry, but inspections instituted in its aftermath
revealed research programs, caches of dangerous materials, and
stockpiles of weapons. 9 Though these programs, materials, and
weapons were dismantled and destroyed, Iraq continually balked
at its arms-control obligations, eventually leading to the complete
interruption of inspections.1 20 In the years leading up to the Iraq
War, it was debated whether Saddam possessed biological and
chemical weapons, and it was generally believed that Iraq had
some biological and chemical capabilities that it was seeking to
enhance. While it was not seriously believed that Iraq possessed
nuclear capabilities, the Bush administration argued that Iraq
was vigorously pursuing them.121
Importantly, the Hussein regime was also known to be
erratic and had demonstrated its aggressiveness. As discussed,
Hussein had initiated two wars of aggression: first against Iran
and then against Kuwait.'2 2 Hussein had menaced other nations
in the region and-unprovoked-fired Scud missiles at Israel.123
Finally, the regime had used chemical weapons against its
11. See MacFarquhar, supra note 100 ("The hanging of Saddam Hussein ended
the life of one of the most brutal tyrants in recent history."); supra text
accompanying notes 10009.
n1 See MacFarquhar, supra note 100.
na See id. The reactor was destroyed in an Israeli airstrike in 1981. See id.
119 See Walzer, supra note 57, at 20.
120 See DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 104, at 850, 857; Walzer, supra note 57, at 20.
121 See Barstow, supra note 5 (discussing the infamous aluminum tubes that the
administration trumpeted as components for the uranium enrichment process, and
Iraq's alleged attempts to secure "yellowcake," a form of concentrated uranium, from
sources in Niger).
122 See MacFarquhar, supra note 100.
1" See id.
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Kurdish population. 12 4  These factors contributed to Iraq's
apparent threat. It was believed that if Iraq obtained the nuclear
weapons it was seeking, it was likely to use them, and that it was
likely to use the weapons it already had obtained. Additionally,
its disdain for international law and norms, and its already
established patterns of aggression, heightened the possibility
that it could transmit such arms to terrorist groups, or even
engage in acts of terrorism of its own. 125
Nevertheless, it is only debatable whether Iraq posed a
sufficient threat to justify pre-emptive warfare. In traditional
just war theory, while pre-emption is not categorically forbidden,
it is justifiable only in the narrowest of circumstances: against
threats that are certain and grave-in other words, against
threats that constitute "a clear and present danger." 126 In the
run up to the invasion, Iraq insisted that it possessed no NBC
weaponry, and U.N. inspectors-whom Iraq had begrudgingly re-
admitted in its attempt to avoid war-found virtually no evidence
of prohibited weaponry or weapons programs.127 Also, Iraq made
no overt preparations for war, other than defensive ones as
invasion became increasinbly inevitable.128  Even the Bush
administration did not argue that Iraq had present nuclear
capabilities.129 Thus, while Iraq's putative biological and
chemical arsenal, its widely believed pursuit of nuclear weapons,
and its pattern of aggression may have presented a "clear"
danger, because Iraq was not preparing for any actual aggression
at the time of the invasion, it is doubtful that its danger was
sufficiently "present" to furnish just cause.130
124 See id.
125 See Barstow, supra note 5.
126 Johnson, The Moral Issues, supra note 54; see Kelsey, supra note 17 ("[P]re-
emption can be morally justified only in rare circumstances-when an unavoidable
attack is likely to be imminent and the threat is grave."); Cardinal James Francis
Stafford, A Familiar and Unsettling Song of War, NAT'L CATH. REP., Feb. 14, 2003,
at 4 (justifying pre-emption only when nations are "under a very imminent threat").
127 See DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 104, at 856 (noting that the only violation
these inspections uncovered was Iraq's possession of ballistic missiles whose range
modestly exceeded United Nations limits).
121 See id. at 857-58; Kelsey, supra note 17 (noting that there was no evidence
that Iraq was about to launch an attack).
19 See Walzer, supra note 57, at 20.
130 Johnson, The Moral Issue, supra note 54 ("While the administration has
made a good case that the danger is clear, it has not demonstrated that it is present,
in the sense of an attack definitely intended and in process of preparation."
(emphasis added)).
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Through a more recent formulation of the imminence
requirement, however, an argument that there was just cause for
pre-emption has been made. The Bush administration
recognized that traditional formulations of just cause for pre-
emptive force require an imminent danger, one signaled by the
preparatory mobilization of armies and navies. It argued,
however, that new realities such as international terrorists and
aggressive "rogue states" with avowed destructive intent,
combined with the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction,
demanded earlier action, even against uncertain threats.131 Some
just war theorists embraced this reasoning in the run up to the
war and argued that there might be just cause even where it
could not be demonstrated that Iraq was making preparations for
an actual attack.'3 2
Just war theorists sometimes caution against applying jus
ad bellum criteria retrospectively, arguing that only what
decision-makers knew-or reasonably should have known-at
the time of deciding to use force should be factored into the moral
calculus.13 3 Thus, the fact that Iraq did not possess chemical or
biological weapons and was not actively developing or
manufacturing them, and that its purported efforts to obtain
nuclear weapons appear to have been fictionalized, may not be
part of the inquiry into whether going to war there was morally
justified. 3 4 It can be argued, however, that claiming Iraq
possessed or was in pursuit of NBC weaponry, on the basis of the
131 See U.S. SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 1. Inaction, it argued, might lead to
a situation where, with such NBC weaponry already in the hands of "rogue states"
or terrorists, it would be too late to take defensive measures. See id.
132 See George, supra note 29 ("[1It would be perverse to suppose that force may
not be used against an aggressive tyrant such as Saddam until after he has armed
himself with weapons of mass destruction."); Weigel, supra note 68, at 707-08 ("The
'regime factor' is crucial in the moral analysis, for weapons of mass destruction are
clearly not aggressions-waiting-to-happen when they are possessed by stable, law-
abiding states.... If the 'regime factor' is crucial in the moral analysis, can we not
say that pre-emptive military action to deny the rogue state that kind of destructive
capacity would not contravene the 'defense against aggression' concept of 'just
cause'?"); supra text accompanying notes 59-62.
1" See Childress, supra note 24, at 360 ("[Wlhat is 'reasonable' depends on the
situations in which actors have to make responsible decisions; retrospective
judgments by others should include only what the actors could and should have
foreseen.").
'" See Barstow, supra note 5. Consensus has developed that the reason for
Iraq's intransigence in not complying with inspections obligations was the regime's
desire to appear to possess or be developing NBC weaponry to maintain leverage
over its neighbors. See MacFarquhar, supra note 100.
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available evidence, was actually quite unreasonable."5 At the
very least, the fact that the threat posed by the regime turned
out to be imaginary only underscores the traditional guidance
that pre-emption should remain narrowly circumscribed.136  It
also adds credence to Walzer's counsel, "[T]he danger to which
[pre-emption] alludes is not only distant but speculative, whereas
the costs of. . . war are near, certain, and usually terrible." 3 7
C. Iraq: Humanitarian Intervention, Pre-Emption, and Right
Authority
With pre-emption and humanitarian intervention, right
authority vests in supranational institutions for reasons of global
security and order. Allowing states unilaterally to determine
when a threat has become sufficiently pronounced to warrant
intervention would be to risk global anarchy. 3 8 Similarly, where
states take it upon themselves to determine the necessity for
humanitarian intervention, there is a risk of sanctioning endless
wars of altruism whose moral legitimacy will be undermined by
international suspicion-and suspicion amongst the population
meant to be benefited-that humanitarian aims are a cloak for
self-interested pursuits.139  The United Nations has particular
authority in this area because only it purports to represent the
best interests of states across the world.14 0
The United States never gained United Nations support, or
broad-based international support, for its venture in Iraq.
Security Council Resolution 1441, which called on Iraq to comply
with inspections, specifically avoided language that would justify
use of force because Russia, China, and France-permanent
council members-resisted it.141 Efforts by the United States and
the United Kingdom to secure a further resolution authorizing
' See generally Barstow, supra note 5 (exhaustively detailing the shoddy
intelligence on which the Bush administration actually based its claims that
Hussein had biological and chemical weapons and was aggressively pursuing
nuclear weapons, and arguing that the administration was aware of the weakness of
its case).
136 See Kelsey, supra note 17 ("Expanding this narrow and exceptional option
into a broad doctrine at the center of U.S. foreign policy is inconsistent with the just-
war tradition.").
1' Walzer, supra note 57; supra text accompanying notes 54-58.
13 See supra text accompanying notes 63-68.
139 See supra text accompanying notes 94-96.
140 See supra text accompanying notes 97-99.
141 See DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 104, at 854-55.
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force ultimately failed to win support in the Security Council-in
fact, the two nations withdrew their draft resolution when it
became apparent that, not only would it be the object of a
permanent-member veto, but it would not even gain majority
support amongst all voting members on the council.14 2
Furthermore, international opinion also resisted the invasion-
even in the nations that, officially, joined the United States'
"coalition."143
Some theorists have criticized the United Nations for failing
to assume moral leadership, thus forcing the United States to
take matters into its own hands4 4 ; however, it is questionable
whether the United States ever took seriously the obligation to
act internationally.4 5 The United States did not meaningfully
participate in negotiations aimed at convincing Iraq to re-admit
inspectors.'4  And the criticism has been made that the United
States, while it sought United Nations support for purposes of
convenience, was ready to abandon international mechanisms as
soon as it did not get its way.14 7 Thus, even if there is truth to
the proposition that, when international institutions fail to
assume moral leadership, that leadership devolves to individual
nations, there is little evidence that the United States ever gave
the United Nations the meaningful opportunity to assume that
leadership.
142 See id. at 856-57.
4- See Harold Meyerson, Clash of Civilizations, AM. PROSPECT, Apr., 2003, at
30, 30 (noting, at the time of the invasion, the flagging support in England for Prime
Minister Tony Blair and in Spain for Prime Minister Jos6 Maria Asnar, and
overwhelming majority opposition in Eastern European nations that officially joined
the United States' efforts).
' See OLIVER O'DONOVAN, THE JUST WAR REVISITED 135 (2003) ("[T]he duty of
deferring to governmental authority is dependent on the availability of that
authority and its capacity to act decisively in a crisis. Just as private citizens may
tackle and detain a mugger in the absence of the police, improvising a form of
government where the official form is not at hand, so a nation may improvise
international justice where international authority is not capable of enacting it.").
14 See id. (noting the United States' complicity in weakening the U.N. system).
'46 See Walzer, supra note 57, at 19 ("The United States has taken little part in
the months-long negotiations aimed at bringing the inspectors back, and it isn't
clear that the administration is prepared to follow up in any serious manner on
Iraq's offer ... to readmit them.").
147 See Meyerson, supra note 143; Sanger, A New Doctrine, supra note 112.
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D. Iraq: Humanitarian Intervention, Pre-Emption, and the
Prudential Criteria
Whether one characterizes the War in Iraq as one of
humanitarian intervention or pre-emption, there is no denying
that it has been extremely costly in human terms. Four
thousand four hundred and nine United States service members
have died serving in Iraq.14 8 In addition, 31,927 service members
have been wounded in action 49 ; and nearly one thousand of those
wounded have lost a limb or limbs.15 0 While insurgent casualties
are difficult to ascertain, one count estimated that nearly 20,000
insurgents had died in operations against United States and
other coalition forces.51 ' The most troubling casualty figures are
those relating to civilian deaths. Iraq Body Count, which
maintains a running tally of civilian deaths based on, among
other sources, news reports, morgue records, and figures
compiled by non-governmental organizations, reports that
between 112,789 and 123,421 civilians have died violently in Iraq
since the invasion in March, 2003.152 Other studies have placed
the figure at even more dizzying heights.' 53
' See U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) U.S.
CASUALTY STATUS (last updated May 29, 2013), http://www.defense.gov/news/
casualty.pdf. This number includes 3,480 combat deaths and 929 "non-hostile"
deaths. See id.
149 See id.
160 See Lizette Alvarez, No Less of a Person, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2010, at MB1
(putting the number at 988).
151 See Jim Michaels, 19,000 Militant Fatalities Since '03, U.S.A. TODAY, Sept.
27, 2007, at 1A.
152 See IRAQ BODY COUNT (last visited May 29, 2013),
http://www.iraqbodycount.org. Legitimate news sources have frequently cited Iraq
Body Count as authoritative throughout the war. See Michael R. Gordon, Hints of
Progress, and Questions, in Iraq Data, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2007, at Al (citing IRAQ
BODY COUNT tallies and analysis as authoritative); With Iraq Toll at 4,000, U.S.
Vows to Battle On, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 25, 2008, at 2 (describing Iraq Body
Count's tally as "widely respected").
13 One study, conducted by researchers at Johns Hopkins University, Al
Mustansiriya University in Baghdad, and M.I.T., estimated that 654,965 Iraqis had
died as a result of the war, a figure that included both violent deaths (601,027) and
deaths from non-violent causes attributable to the invasion-for example, from
disease caused by the breakdown of services. See GILBERT BURNHAM ET AL., THE
HUMAN COST OF THE WAR IN IRAQ: A MORTALITY STUDY, 2002-2006 10 (2006),
http://web.mit.edu/humancostiraq/reports.html. This study used a method that has
been considered legitimate in conflict zones such as Darfur and the Congo. See
Sabrina Tavernise & Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Iraqi Dead May Total 600,000, Study
Says, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2006, at A16. For an account of an earlier study by the
same researchers that used the same techniques, as well as an exhaustive-and
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This bloodbath raises a serious question as to whether the
United States satisfied the jus ad bellum criterion of overall
proportionality. As has been noted, just war theorists have
cautioned that, while overall proportionality is likely to be
satisfied when humanitarian intervention averts genocide or
ethnic cleansing, it is not likely to be satisfied when instituted
merely to correct a regime's pattern of human rights abuses.'5 4
Just war theorists understand that these abuses are deeply
tragic; but they also recognize that, while regimes such as
Saddam Hussein's are undoubtedly evil, resort to warfare is
likely to produce death and suffering far beyond what a
repressive regime is able to inflict."'5 As has been discussed,
Hussein certainly denied his people basic human rights; and
Hussein had perpetrated brazen crimes against humanity upon
ethnic and religious groups-the Kurds and Shiites-that can be
deemed genocidal.'56 Nevertheless, the Hussein regime was not,
in 2003 or the previous decade, in a position to massacre or
commit genocide against its people. 5 1 In fact, no-fly zones
aggressively patrolled by American aircraft over the Kurdish
north and the Shiite south protected these vulnerable
populations. 15
Moreover, the violence into which Iraq descended could have
been foreseen. Arguably, coalition forces have not caused the
bulk of civilian deaths in Iraq; rather, in the aftermath of the
U.S. invasion, Iraqis, driven by political, sectarian, or merely
criminal motives have visited vast destruction on their fellow
ultimately heartbreaking-defense of its methods and conclusions, listen to What's
in a Number?, THIS AMERICAN LIFE (Oct. 28, 2005),
http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/300/whats-in-a-number.
154 See supra text accompanying note 93.
66 See Langan, supra note 92, at 123.
'- See supra text accompanying notes 102-03.
157 See Blankenhorn et al., supra note 56; Walzer, supra note 57.
15 See Blankenhorn et al., supra note 56 ("While Iraq's government is certainly
brutal and repressive, there is no evidence, so long as no-fly zones over Iraq are
enforced, that Iraq's government is currently in a position to engage in widespread
killings of Kurds or Shiites living in Iraq."); Walzer, supra note 57 ("[N]ow that a
zone of (relative) safety has been carved out for the Kurds in the North, there is no
compelling case to be made for humanitarian intervention in Iraq. The Baghdad
regime is brutally repressive and morally repugnant, certainly, but it is not engaged
in mass murder or ethnic cleansing.").
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citizens.15 9 Nevertheless, while this fact may be relevant to a jus
in bello evaluation of the United States' combat operations, the
possibility of triggering more extensive violence by resorting to
force is a factor that nations are under a moral obligation to take
into account before going to war, particularly in the context of
humanitarian intervention and pre-emption. 6 0  And the deep
ethnic and religious rifts dividing the people of Iraq were not
unknown."' While the proportionality determination takes into
account factors beyond mere human and material destruction-
for example, the benefits to peace and order of removing a
repugnant regime-it is difficult to see how deposing Hussein
could justify the loss of more than 100,000 lives, among other
destruction. 16 2 For these reasons, it is doubtful that the United
States satisfied the jus ad bellum requirement of overall
proportionality-that is, the expected potential for loss of life and
destruction exceeded the benefit of deposing the Hussein regime.
Finally, the probability of success may not have been
sufficient to justify invasion. Certainly, with respect to pre-
emption, the United States was successful in rapidly removing
Hussein from power; and had Hussein possessed weapons of
mass destruction, these too would have been neutralized.6  But,
with respect to rebuilding Iraq following Hussein's deposition,
the United States met with less success. The United States
hoped that its efforts would be greeted with jubilation in the
streets of Iraq.'" Moreover, the United States hoped that this
jubilation would be shared across the Middle East, and that the
overthrow of Hussein would encourage other nations to moderate
159 See BURNHAM ET AL., supra note 153, at 8; Sabrina Tavernise & Andrew W.
Lehren, A Grim Portrait of Civilian Deaths in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/23/world/middleeast/23casualties.html.
160 See REGAN, supra note 3, at 69-70; Phillips, Humanitarian Intervention,
supra note 30, at 3; supra text accompanying notes 69-70, 80-93.
161 See Starr, supra note 112, at 3 ("[A]fter years of despotism and minority
[Sunni] control, the deep suspicions among ethnoreligious groups will make it hard
even to maintain the country's political stability."). The modern Iraqi state was an
unnatural imposition by the British on a heterogeneous population of Sunnis,
Shiites, and Kurds. See Jon Lee Anderson, Invasions, NEW YORKER, Mar. 24, 2003,
http-/www.newyorker.com/archive/2003/03/24/030324fa fact?currentPage=1.
162 See Murray, supra note 14, at 249-50.
163 David E. Sanger, With "Good Riddance" to Hussein, Bush Vows Resolve, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2003, at Al.
1" See Sanger, A New Doctrine, supra note 112.
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and democratize.'6 5 This popular support never materialized. In
fact, three years after the invasion, Iraq had only barely
functioning police and military forces, was experiencing sectarian
warfare and murder, and the Iraqi government was still unable
to provide its citizens with basic services such as electricity, clean
drinking water, and sewage removal, not to mention healthcare
and education. Moreover, Iraq's neighbors, rather than
democratizing, seem bent on undermining the nation and
exploiting its instability.16 6 There is uncertainty as to whether
these results should have been predicted-indeed, assessing
"probability of success" is difficult in advance of a war and
problematic in hindsight-but their sharp divergence from
certain rosy expectations suggest that, at some point, there was a
breakdown in realistic deliberation.16 7
IV. CONCLUSION TO PARTS I-III
The United States used pre-emption and humanitarian
intervention to justify its 2003 invasion of Iraq. Just war
tradition limits pre-emption to situations where an aggressor is
actually preparing to launch an attack, and Iraq was not making
such preparations in 2003. Even if the just cause requirement
was satisfied by Iraq's aggressive intentions and purported
pursuit of NBC weaponry, the United States did not meet the jus
ad bellum criteria of likelihood of success, overall proportionality,
or right authority. Likewise, Iraq's regime was reprehensible,
possibly furnishing just cause for an invasion on grounds of
humanitarian intervention. Nevertheless, the grisly results of
the invasion, the poor reception of the United States' efforts
among the Iraqi people, and international resistance to the
invasion suggest that the United States also did not meet the jus
ad bellum criteria of overall proportionality, likelihood of success,
or right authority for humanitarian intervention.
1" See William Galston, Perils of Preemptive War, AM. PROSPECT, Sept. 23,
2002, at 22, 22.
'6 See Michael R. Gordon, Meddling Neighbors Undercut Iraq's Political
Stability, Cables Say, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2010, at All; Hendrik Hertzberg, Studies
Say, NEW YORKER, Dec. 18, 2006, at 33 (discussing the result of the Iraq Study
Group report).
167 See ELSHTAIN, supra note 4, at 62 ("What about the prospect of success? This
prudential consideration is always tricky.").
104
2012] CATHOLIC JUST WAR AND THE WAR IN IRAQ 105
V. SUPPLEMENTARY COMMENTS ON THE CATHOLIC JUST WAR
TRADITION AND THE WAR IN IRAQ: WITHDRAWAL AND THE ETHIC
OF PEACE (FEBRUARY, 2012)
A. Ditente?
Since completing The Catholic Just War Tradition and the
War in Iraq, America's foreign-affairs landscape has changed.
Nevertheless, circumstances do not appear to have altered the
just war analysis of American foreign policy in Iraq; in fact, the
firestorm the United States ignited in 2003 appears tenacious
and dire predictions continue to prove themselves accurate.
On December 15, 2011, President Obama formally
announced the end of nearly nine-years of American combat
operations.16 8 Under Obama's oversight, American forces in Iraq
slowly fell to a fraction of their former strength: In 2007, 170,000
Coalition troops occupied Iraq from 505 bases; in December,
2011, 4,000 operated from only two. 69  President Obama has
affirmed he will send no additional troops to Iraq, even in the
case of civil war, and America's role will be limited to a political
168 See Editorial, A Formal End, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 16, 2011, at A42. For
perspective on the length of the Iraq War, consider it in relation to other American
conflicts. The United States openly bombarded Iraq during the night of March 19-
20, 2003, and twenty-one days later, Baghdad fell. See 21 Days to Baghdad
(National Geographic video July 1, 2003). During the eight-and-one-half years of
warfare that elapsed before President Obama's announcement, the U.S. overthrew
Saddam Hussein's regime; established a fragile "democracy"; witnessed the trials
and grisly hangings of Hussein and others in his administration; and battled
dedicated Baathist, Sunni, Shiite, and otherwise anti-American militants. The Iraq
War cut short the lives of some 4,500 American soldiers; tens of thousands of Iraqi
militants; and, counted conservatively, at least one-hundred-thousand non-
combatant Iraqi civilians. See IRAQ BODY COUNT, supra note 152 (displaying a
constantly updated estimate of Iraq war casualties based on public records).
Consider the duration of other twentieth century American conflicts: U.S. airpower
hammered Iraqi forces beginning January 17, 1991, and then, from February 23d
and over an additional 100 hours, its ground troops definitively drove the Iraqi Army
from Kuwait; American combat forces battled North Vietnam's army and Viet Cong
militants for eight years, from 1965 until it commenced withdrawal after the 1973
Paris Accords; the Korean War was active for three years, between June, 1950, and
July, 1953; U.S. troops fought in World War II for almost four years, between
December, 1941, and August, 1945; and American involvement in World War I
lasted roughly one-and-one-half years, between April, 1917, and November, 1918.
169 See Thom Shanker et al., In Baghdad, Panetta Leads Uneasy Moment of
Closure to a Long Conflict, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 16, 2011, at A19; A Formal End, supra
note 168.
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one: resolving future conflicts by diplomacy rather than
firepower. 170
Our war, then, is virtually complete. But whether war is
over for Iraqis is a question that is morally significant to the
United States. As our forces return home, Iraqis face the
specters of terrorism, oppression, and civil war.' From a just
war perspective, the United States cannot ignore that reality:
Because it instigated hostilities, it is obligated toward the nation
it leaves behind. 72
This supplement asks, then, What moral considerations
guide this moment in contemporary history? Can we celebrate a
war's end or should we lament a moral failure?
B. Iraq Without Occupation
During the United States withdrawal, Iraq has descended
further into violence. Occupation did not overcome Iraq's
political, religious, and ethnic divisions; rather, a national crisis
has emerged and thousands perish in renewed sectarian
conflict.17 3  Moreover, the Iraqi police apparatus has allegedly
resorted to human rights violations that imitate the Hussein
regime's. 1 74 Additionally unsettling-and surely contributing to
the chaos-Iraq's infrastructure and economy remain
devastated."'7  Thus, events indicate that this exceedingly long
conflict achieved little: Iraq is not at peace and its people suffer
from both their new regime and the opponents of that regime.
10 See Helene Cooper & Thom Shanker, U.S. Embraces Low-Key Plan in Iraqi
Crisis, N.Y. TiMES, Dec. 25, 2011, at Al.
171 See Michael S. Schmidt, Explosions Across Iraq Kill Dozens Amid Political
Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/06/world/
middleeastlexplosions-across-baghdad-kill-dozens.html?ref=iraq.
172 See REGAN, supra note 3, at 70 (discussing the obligations of states to
consider the secondary and tertiary violence intervention may ignite). Considering
these eventualities in advance aligns with the criterion of just cause. See Childress,
supra note 24, at 360 (stating that right intention is "shaped by the pursuit of a just
cause").
"I See Schmidt, supra note 171.
174 See, e.g., Jack Healy, Iraq Turns Justice into a Show, and Terror Confessions
a Script, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2012, at Al (describing the regime's response to the
renewed bouts of terrorism, resort to torture to obtain confessions, and human rights
violations like parading accused before news cameras).
"1 See A Formal End, supra note 168.
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C. Withdrawal: What Contemporary Guidance?
Pope Benedict XVI has unwaveringly opposed the United
States' presence in Iraq. In 2002, then-Cardinal Joseph
Ratzinger argued that invading Iraq without United Nations
approval was unjustifiable.1 6  Likewise, in 2008, Benedict XVI
denounced the war as a bloodbath and lamented that innocent
Iraqi civilians were being forced to bear "the consequences of a
war that provoked the breakup of their civil and social life"-
squarely placing moral responsibility for Iraq's internal strife on
the United States' invasion."'
But Benedict's stance does not answer the question
presented today: Having invaded-justifiably or not-do we have
a moral obligation to stay until we have achieved our goal of
establishing a stable democracy with neither the brutality,
oppression, and violence of Saddam Hussein's regime, nor the
looming threats of terrorism and civil war?17 8
D. Consistent Word from Global Religious Bodies
By cobbling together three recent statements from the
Vatican, the Anglican Church, and the USCCB, an ethical
obligation to promote peace and protect human life-an ethic
relevant to our endgame in Iraq-begins to take form. In the
withdrawal landscape, the criterion that war's object be peace
comes to the forefront of the just war analysis.
1. The Vatican
In Pope Benedict's 2012 annual homily on the World Day of
Peace, he deplored societies' tendency to subsume the concerns of
the broader community to parochial ones." Benedict
emphasized patience and perseverance in promoting peace
176 See Cardinal Ratzinger Says Unilateral Attack on Iraq Not Justified, ZENIT
(Sept. 22, 2002), http://www.zenit.org/article-5398?l=english.
177 Nicole Winfield, Pope: Enough with Slaughters in Iraq, U.S.A. TODAY (Mar.
16, 2008), http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-03-16-340118605_x.htm.
78 See generally U.S. SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 1, at 15-16 (outlining the
Bush administration's pre-war international objectives).
179 See POPE BENEDICT XVI, MESSAGE FOR THE CELEBRATION OF THE WORLD
DAY OF PEACE: EDUCATING YOUNG PEOPLE IN JUSTICE AND PEACE, §§ 3-4 (Jan. 1,
2012), available at http-//www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict-xvilmessages/peace/
documents/hfben-xvimes_20111208_xlv-world-day-peace-en.html.
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because doing so is an "essential task" no one can "shirk."8 0
Benedict elaborated on the meaning of this discipline, almost
certainly referring to the Iraq withdrawal:
Peace is not merely the absence of war, and it is not limited to
maintaining a balance of powers between adversaries. Peace
cannot be attained on earth without safeguarding the goods of
persons, ... respect for the dignity of persons and peoples, and
the assiduous practice of fraternity.' 8'
Thus, Benedict alerted humanity to be wary of "false
solutions which often seem the easiest way to overcome
problems" of conflict, but that are only easy ways out.' 82
2. The Anglican Church
Archbishop of Canterbury Rowan Williams expressed a
similar ethic in his 2011 Christmas Sermon. 8 3 The Archbishop
called on humankind to exhibit "unstinting generosity" and
aspire to protect human life.'" At the same time, he admitted
the necessary challenge this aspiration entails, asking, "[A]re you
on your own side, on the side of disconnection, rivalry, the
hoarding of gifts, the obsession with control? [Yet to] answer
that you're on the side of life doesn't mean for a moment that you
can now relax into a fuzzy philosophy of 'life-affirming'
comfort."185 From Archbishop Williams' message, we understand
that solidarity, serving others, and respecting the duty never to
succumb to blind self-interest are unrelenting, even if
burdensome, obligations.'8 6
3. The USCCB
Finally, in a statement issued in February, 2011, the
USCCB's Office of International Justice and Peace ("OIJP")
expressly addressed the Iraq War, withdrawal, and
1 Id. §§ 5-6.
181 Id. § 5.
182 Id. § 6.
'8 See Archbishop Rowan Williams, Christmas Sermon: Don't Build Lives on
Selfishness and Fear (Dec. 25, 2011), available at
httpJ/www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/articles.php/2292/.
184 See id.
185 Id. (characterizing this challenge through a structuralist interpretation of
the Anglican Book of Common Prayer).
186 See id.
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corresponding ethical demands.87 Though the USCCB urged
"full withdrawal at the earliest opportunity," it also insisted that
withdrawal be consistent with "responsible transition."'88 The
OIJP explicitly defined "responsible transition" in context of the
Iraq withdrawal:
[Responsible transition] aims to reduce further loss of life,
address the humanitarian crisis in Iraq and the refugee crisis in
the region, help rebuild the war-torn country, promote political
reconciliation in Iraq, protect human rights and religious
freedom, and engage international support, including Syria and
Iran. The USCCB urges strong action to protect Christians and
other minorities. Although the combat phase of U.S.
engagement in Iraq has ended, the moral obligation of our
nation toward the Iraqi people has not.'89
Put in context, "responsible transition" is consistent with
Pope Benedict and Archbishop Williams' more general
exhortations: While circumstances change, while a war may be
declared "over," the ethic of peace presides-unstinting,
demanding, skeptical.
E. The Ethic of Peace and the Iraq Withdrawal
From these three bodies, we find an ethic applicable to
American withdrawal. The mere absence of a troop commitment
does not mean that we have fulfilled our moral obligations to
promote peace and safeguard human life. Instead, it remains
incumbent on the United States to protect those endangered by
the hazards that our military action unleashed-hazards that
may persist even after we abandon combat.
Part of our consideration must be whether we can even
achieve such protection without a troop presence. The United
States, a nation whose resources-human, as well as financial
and diplomatic-have been consumed during the invasion and
occupation surely welcomes the relief ocassioned by withdrawal.
Yet taking the "peaceful" route in Iraq-potentially at the
expense of the Iraqi community-may be an impermissible
abdication of our moral obligations. Because we led Iraq into its
..7 See generally UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, OFFICE
OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND PEACE, BACKGROUND ON IRAQ (2011), available at
http://old.usccb.org/jphd/csmg/2011/2011-02IraqBackgrounderFinalRevision.pdf.
" Id.
189 See id.
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present straits, appeal to war fatigue will not excuse prioritizing
our national comfort at the expense of Iraqis' rights to life, peace,
and justice.
CONCLUSION
One wonders, in light of the rapid onset of violence and
oppression that followed President Obama's announcement,
whether we have, indeed, met this moral obligation. It may be
that peace was better served by bringing American troops
home-for example, the current violence may be temporary, or
ultimately less destructive than the violence occupation
engendered. Perhaps self-governance-with American
diplomatic engagement and support-is the solution that the
Iraqi people need.
Yet, it may also be that our presence in Iraq was essential to
suppressing violence in a fragile nation, one in need of an armed
power to quell its disputes. Whatever the result, our moral
obligations are clear: to promote peace tirelessly without placing
our own well being above the Iraqi community's equally
legitimate rights to life and safety. Weighing these competing
interests cannot be easy; but the moral obligation to do so is
inescapable.
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